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All usWe estimate a dynamic life cycle model of labor supply, fertility, and
savings, incorporating occupational choices, with specific wage paths
and skill atrophy that vary over the career. This allows us to understand
the trade-off between occupational choice and desired fertility, as well
as sorting both into the labormarket and across occupations. We quan-
tify the life cycle career costs associated with children, how they de-
compose into loss of skills during interruptions, lost earnings opportu-
nities, and selection into more child-friendly occupations. We analyze
the long-run effects of policies that encourage fertility and show that
they are considerably smaller than short-run effects.I. IntroductionIn almost all developed countries, despite significant improvements over
the last decades, women still earn less than men (see Blau and Kahn [1996]
and Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer [2005] for evidence), they are
often underrepresented in leading positions, and their careers developding through Economic and Social Research Council grant RES-000-22-0620 is grate-
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Allat a slower pace (see, e.g., Catalyst 2009). Having childrenmay be one im-
portant reason for these disadvantages, and the costs of children for wom-
en’s careers and lifetime earnings may be substantial. One key question
for investigation, therefore, is the magnitude of these costs and how they
decompose into loss of skills during interruptions, lost earnings opportu-
nities, and lower accumulation of experience. Another important ques-
tion is how intended fertility, even before children are born, affects the
type of career a woman chooses. Addressing these issues requires an un-
derstanding of the dynamics of women’s choices, howunobserved fertility
preferences and ability affect the sorting into different career paths, and
how intermittency patterns, work decisions, savings decisions, and fertility
choices interact with each other.
This paper addresses these questions by estimating a dynamic model
that describes the labor supply, occupational choices, assets, marital status,
and fertility decisions of women over the life cycle. Our model builds on
the early work by Polachek (1981), Weiss and Gronau (1981), and Gronau
(1988), which emphasizes the important connection between expected in-
termittency and occupational choice. Like Polachek, we allow different
occupations to have different entry wages and different rates of atrophy
(skill depreciation) and wage growth. In addition, we allow atrophy rates
to vary over the career cycle and occupations to vary according to their
amenity valuewith regard to children.We cast this in a dynamic setting that
endogenizes occupational choice, human capital, wages, savings decisions,
and fertility, and that allows for unobservedheterogeneity in ability and the
taste for children. Hence, our model integrates occupational and fertility
choices into a woman’s life cycle plan, where women with different fertility
plans opt for different occupations so as to balance a potentially higher
wage path with higher atrophy rates during work interruptions. Further,
it explicitly implements risk aversion and savings, thus taking account of
the trade-off between building up assets early in the career and maternity
during a woman’s most fertile period.
While many papers have addressed the issues of female labor supply
and fertility, most have dealt with them in isolation.1 Early papers that1 Early papers by Becker (1960), Becker and Lewis (1973), and Willis (1973) study fertility
decisions and their dependence on household background variables in a static context. Sev-
eral authors, including Heckman and Willis (1976), Ward and Butz (1980), Rosenzweig and
Schultz (1983, 1985), Wolpin (1984), Cigno and Ermisch (1989), Blackburn, Bloom, and
Neumark (1990), Heckman and Walker (1990), Hotz and Miller (1993), Leung (1994), Ar-
royo and Zhang (1997), and Altug and Miller (1998), propose dynamic models of fertility
but assume labor supply decisions as exogenous. On the other hand, a related literature
on women’s labor supply behavior takes fertility decisions as exogenous; see, e.g., Heckman
and MaCurdy (1980), Blau and Robins (1988), Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), van der Klaauw
(1996), Hyslop (1999), Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008), Keane and Sauer (2009),
and Blundell et al. (2013); see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a survey.
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els, such as Moffitt (1984) or Hotz and Miller (1988). More recent pa-
pers that use dynamic life cycle models to study these as joint decisions
include Francesconi (2002), Gayle and Miller (2006), Sheran (2007),
and Keane and Wolpin (2010). We extend this work in three significant
ways. First, we incorporate occupational choices to better understand
the interplay between job characteristics, such as skill atrophy or differ-
ential wage growth, and the planning of fertility, as well as the sorting
that takes place both into the labor market and across occupations. Sec-
ond, we allow for skill atrophy, which can differ not just between occupa-
tions but also over the career cycle. This is important to capture the trade-
off between occupational choice and desired fertility, with possibly high
atrophy rates at career stages where fertility is most desirable. Third, we
allow for an intertemporal budget constraint and risk aversion, which
adds to our understanding of the relationship between savings and fertil-
ity and is important when investigating the dynamic aspects of policies
that incentivize fertility.
We study this for Germany, where individuals who choose to attend
lower-track schools at age 10 (about 65 percent of each cohort) enroll
after graduation (and at the age of 15–16) in a 2–3 year vocational train-
ing program in one of 360 occupations within the German apprentice-
ship system.2 This unique setting enables us to observe initial occupa-
tional choices for these individuals before fertility decisions are made
but conditional on individual preferences for future fertility. Our pri-
mary data set is administrative in nature and allows precise measurement
of wages, career interruptions, labor supply, and occupations, including
the initial occupational choice, for many cohorts across different regions
over several decades. We combine these data with survey data to measure
fertility, household formation, and savings decisions.
Our model and estimated parameters produce valuable insights into
the different components of the career costs of children, the contribu-
tion of fertility to explaining the male-female wage differential, and the
short-run and long-run impact of transfer policies on fertility. We esti-
mate that about three-quarters of the career costs of children stem from
lost earnings due to intermittency or reduced labor supply, while the re-
mainder is due to wage responses, as a result of lost investments in skills
and depreciation. More specifically, we show that skill depreciation rates
are higher in midcareer and differ across occupations, as do the oppor-
tunity costs of raising children and the child raising value, so that differ-2 These occupations range from hairdresser to medical assistant to bank clerk, and two in
three individuals of each birth cohort follow an apprenticeship-based career route. See Fit-
zenberger and Kunze (2005) for details on the occupational choices of males and females.
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Allent occupational choices lead to different costs of raising children and
affect the timing of their birth. Our results highlight that the selection
into different careers is based not only on ability but also on desired fer-
tility, so that some costs of fertility incur well before children are born.
Both atrophy and prior selection into child-friendly occupations based
on expected fertility therefore contribute to the career costs of children.
We also provide evidence on dynamic selection, where fertility leads to
changes in the ability composition of working women over the life cycle.
Using a sample of comparable male cohorts whomade similar educational
choices, we run simulations to understand better the wage differences be-
tween women and men over the life course and how these are affected by
fertility decisions. We find that fertility explains an important part of the
gender wage gap, especially for women in their mid-30s.
Finally, we use our model to simulate the impact of pronatalist transfer
policies. Most previous studies that investigate the effect of these policies
on fertility are based on difference-in-difference (DiD) designs and fo-
cus on short-term impacts (see, e.g.,Milligan 2005; Lalive and Zweimüller
2009; Cohen, Dehejia, and Romanov 2013; Laroque and Salanie 2014).
In contrast, our model allows us to evaluate both short-term and long-
term effects and to distinguish between responses through the timing of
fertility in reaction to an announced policy versus a change in overall fer-
tility. In doing so, we show not only that the long-run effect of a subsidy
policy is considerably lower than the short-run effects estimated in the lit-
erature but that such policies may also have a long-run impact on skill ac-
cumulation, labor supply, and occupational choice. More importantly, we
demonstrate that these policies are likely to have a far larger impact on
younger women, as they can adjustmany life course decisionsolder women
have already made. These younger cohorts, however, are typically not con-
sidered in DiD-type studies as their fertility does not respond in a narrow
window around the policy.II. Background, Data, and Descriptive Evidence
A. Institutional Background and DataFollowing fourth grade (at about age 10), the German education system
tracks individuals into three different school types: low- and intermediate-
track schools, which end after grades 9 and 10 (age 15/16), or high-track
schools, which end after grade 13. About one-third of the cohorts stud-
ied here attend each of the three school types. Traditionally, only high-
track schools qualify individuals for university entrance, while low- and
intermediate-track schools prepare for highly structured 2–3-year appren-
ticeship training schemes that combine occupation-specific on-site train-
ing 3–4 days a week with academic training at state schools 1–2 days aThis content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
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sions, covermany occupations that in theUnited States require college at-
tendance (e.g., nurse, medical assistant, accountant). At the end of the
training period, apprentices are examined on the basis of centrally mon-
itored standards, and successful candidates are certified as skilled workers
in the chosen profession.
In our analysis, we concentrate on women born in West Germany be-
tween 1955 and 1975 who attend lower- and intermediate-track schools
and then enroll in an apprenticeship training scheme after school comple-
tion.4 We follow these women throughout their careers for up to 26 years
in the labor market. We draw on three main data sets (described in more
detail in the online appendix): register-based data from the German so-
cial security records (IABS data) and survey data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS).
The IABS data cover a 2 percent sample of all employees in Germany that
contributed to the social security system between 1975 and 2001 and pro-
vide detailed information on wage profiles, transitions in and out of work,
occupational choice, education, age, and periods of apprenticeship train-
ing. The sample we construct contains about 2.7 million observations on
wages and work spells. We use the GSOEP data to measure, for a sample
from the same birth cohorts as in the register-based data set, women’s fer-
tility behavior over their careers, as well as family background and spousal
information. Finally, we use the EVS data to compute savings rates.
All analyses concentrate on the German population. Because the reg-
ister data exclude the self-employed and civil servants, we exclude these
groups from our analysis, as well as all individuals who have ever worked
in East Germany. We provide more detail about the sample construction
in the online appendix.5B. Occupation GroupsWe allocate occupations to groups that reflect the trade-off between ca-
reers that offer a higher wage but punish interruptions and careers that
imply lower profiles but also lower atrophy rates. To achieve that, we use
information on the task content of occupations, drawing on the task-based
framework introduced by Autor, Levy, andMurnane (2003). This results in
an aggregation of the many occupations into three larger groups accord-3 For instance, training is provided only in recognized occupations, skilled training person-
nel must be present at the training site, and trainees must pass monitored exit examinations.
4 Women born in East Germany experienced different conditions while growing up be-
hind the Iron Curtain, and we do not observe them in administrative data until after Ger-
man reunification.
5 Earnings in all data sets we use have been deflated using Consumer Price Index data
for private households (German Statistical Office) and converted into euros, with the base
year being 1995.
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Alling to characteristics that are meaningful in the context we study, distin-
guishing between occupations in which tasks performed are mostly rou-
tine, occupations in which tasks are mostly analytic or interactive, and oc-
cupations in which tasks are mostly manual but not routine. We refer to
these three occupational groups as routine, abstract, and manual occupa-
tions.6
Requirements in jobs with mainly abstract tasks are likely to change at
a faster pace than those in routine dominated occupations, while those
in manual occupations may take an intermediate position. For instance,
shop assistants and sewers are classified as routine occupations and re-
quire a set of skills that are acquired in the early stages of the career (such
as product knowledge and relational skills) but are unlikely to change
much over time. On the other hand, bank clerks and medical assistants
(classified as abstract) are likely to require constant updating of their
skills because of rapidly changing information technologies or new fi-
nancial products, while nurses and stewards (classified asmanual occupa-
tions) may take an intermediate position. We show below that wage pro-
files, but also atrophy rates, are indeed higher in abstract occupations
than in routine or manual occupations.C. Occupational Choice, Labor Supply, Fertility,
and SavingsIn table 1, we present descriptive statistics for the whole sample and by
current occupation. About 45 percent of all women in our sample choose
an initial (training) occupation withmore abstract tasks, while 25 percent
and 30 percent, respectively, choose routine or manual occupations. The
second row of the table illustrates that current occupational proportions
are similar to those for initial occupations, indicating that few women
switch occupations over their careers. This is confirmed by the transition
rates across groups in panel A of the table, illustrating that 98.6 percent
of individuals remain in the same occupational group in two consecutive
years.
In panel B, we report initial wages at age 20 and real wage growth in
each of the three occupation categories after 5, 10, and 15 years of po-
tential experience. Women in more abstract occupations not only earn
higher wages than those in the two other groups at the start of their ca-6 Autor et al. (2003) distinguish between (i) nonroutine analytic, (ii) nonroutine inter-
active, (iii) routine cognitive, (iv) routine manual, and (v) nonroutine manual jobs. These
are often combined into abstract (i, ii), routine (iii, iv), and manual (v) jobs. We follow
Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schoenberg (2009), Black and Spitz-Oener (2010), andGathmann
and Schonberg (2010), who allocate two-digit occupations to these three groups, using data
from the German Qualification and Career Survey 1985/86, which includes survey informa-
tion on tasks performed on the job. The construction of the task indicators and the classifica-
tion of occupations across the three groups are detailed in the online appendix.
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Panel C reports the accumulation of total labor market experience, bro-
ken down by part-time and full-time work and by occupational category
and evaluated after 15 years of potential labormarket experience. WomenTABLE 1




Initial occupation 25.0% 44.8% 30.3% 100%
Occupation of work 25.4% 52.7% 21.9%
A
Annual occupational transition rates:
If in routine last year 97.9% 1.5% .5%
If in abstract last year .7% 99.0% .2%
If in manual last year .9% .8% 98.3%
B
Log wage at age 20 3.598 3.742 3.470 3.634
(.297) (.301) (.386) (.337)
Log wage growth, at potential
experience 5 5 years .0485 .0551 .0450 .0510
(.187) (.156) (.196) (.175)
Log wage growth, at potential
experience 5 10 years .0181 .0240 .0152 .0208
(.187) (.206) (.223) (.206)
Log wage growth, at potential
experience 5 15 years .00995 .0147 .0127 .0133
(.206) (.195) (.211) (.200)
C
Total work experience after 15 years 11.55 12.81 12.14 12.34
(3.273) (2.624) (2.880) (2.909)
Full-time work experience after 15 years 10.32 11.92 10.86 11.29
(3.907) (3.348) (3.570) (3.617)
Part-time work experience after 15 years 1.229 .889 1.274 1.056
(2.187) (1.828) (2.125) (1.997)
D
Total log wage loss, after interruption5 1 year 2.0968 2.147 2.105 2.121
(.560) (.636) (.633) (.613)
Total log wage loss, after interruption5 3 years 2.152 2.253 2.223 2.216
(.604) (.639) (.619) (.625)
E
Age at first birth 27.27 28.39 25.94 27.56
(4.138) (3.783) (3.517) (3.943)
No child (%) at age 38 14.39 20.08 14.86 17.58
(3.067) (2.544) (4.164) (1.787)
One child (%) at age 38 25.00 28.92 18.92 26.15
(3.783) (2.879) (4.584) (2.063)
Two or more children (%) at age 38 60.61 51.00 66.22 56.26
(4.269) (3.174) (5.536) (2.328)This content downloaded from 128.0
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Allwho have chosen an occupation with predominantly abstract tasks accu-
mulate 1.2 years (or 10 percent) more total work experience and about
1.6 more full-time work experience over this period than women in rou-
tine task-dominated occupations. Finally, panel D reports changes in daily
wages after an interruption of 1 or 3 years, where changes in work hours,
firm size, andoccupation are conditionedout. Theoverall logwage loss for
a 1-year (3-year) interruption is about 0.12 (0.21) log points. Wage losses
are highest in abstract and lowest in routine occupations.
Thus, the costs of interruptions in terms of both forgone earnings and
atrophy differ between occupational groups and are highest in occupa-
tions dominated by abstract tasks. This is reflected by different fertility
patterns, as shown in panel E, where women in abstract jobs are more
likely to remain childless or to have only one child, while being less likely
to have two or more children, and being older at the birth of their first
child.While these figures suggest sizable differences between womenwho
choose different occupational careers at an early point in their life cycle,
they cannot be interpreted causally because of selectionof women into oc-
cupations, fertility behavior, and labor supply patterns based on fertility
preferences and labor market abilities.
In figure 1 we plot the average household savings rates as a function of
the age of the woman. Savings rates have a hump-shaped profile, at leastFIG. 1.—Savings rates and age: evidence from EVS data set. Computed from EVS data,
by pooling the waves 1993–2008.This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
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age 28, after which they decrease. The figure suggests that savings are
built up before the arrival of children, indicating that savings are an im-
portant element in the fertility decision and that parents are smoothing
consumption over the life cycle and in response to the added expenditures
linked to children. Building up a sufficient stock of assets could therefore
be an important reason to delay pregnancy, in addition to career consider-
ations.III. A Life Cycle Model of Fertility
and Career ChoiceOur objective is to develop an estimable life cycle model to assess the ca-
reer costs of children. To achieve that, our model has to be able to eval-
uate the costs of fertility by considering all associated decisions. There
are at least three elements that determine the career costs of children.
First, childrenmay require intermittency periods of unearned wages dur-
ing which women cannot work. Second, during intermittency, there will
be no skill accumulation, and existing skills may depreciate. Third, de-
pending on ability and expected fertility, women may sort into occupa-
tions that minimize the expected career costs of children. In particular,
occupations may differ in terms of opportunity costs of raising children
and in how skills depreciate. To understand how these different deter-
minants of the costs of fertility operate, weneed to understandhow fertility
is planned. This requires, in addition to the above components, modeling
of the evolution of assets over a woman’s work career, which in turn will
interact with both fertility and career decisions. Thus, consideration of sav-
ings decisions is an important building block in ourmodel. In the next sec-
tion, we describe the main components of our model. We provide a more
detailed description in the Appendix and in the online appendix.A. The SetupIn each period, individuals choose consumption (and savings), whether
to have an additional child, labor supply, and the type of occupation they
work in. Frictions in the labor market imply that individuals have to wait
for offers to adjust their labor supply. In the first period, around the age
of 15, they decide on a particular training occupation and enroll in a 2–
3-year apprenticeship training scheme. Time is discrete, a period lasts for
6 months, and we consider women in the age range 15–80, thus starting
at the age when occupational decisions are made. We first present the
building blocks of our model and then show how decisions are made.
Ex ante heterogeneity.—Weallowforexanteheterogeneity,whichwemodel
in terms of discrete mass points, along four dimensions: labor market pro-This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
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Allductivity—or ability—( f Pi ), taste for leisure ( f
L
i ), taste for children ( f
C
i ),
and potential infertility ( f Fi ).We collect these characteristics in the vector
fi. As four-dimensional heterogeneity is very demanding in terms of iden-
tification and computation, we place some restrictions onhow these char-
acteristics vary across individuals. We group together ability and the taste
for leisure. While individuals with high ability can have a different taste
for leisure than low-ability individuals, we do not allow for heterogeneity
in the taste for leisure, conditional on ability. We allow for unobserved
heterogeneity in the “taste for children” to be correlated with ability and
the taste for leisure, and we estimate this correlation. Further, we assume
that potential infertility is orthogonal to the first three characteristics,
meaning that, while women know the first three characteristics, they do
not anticipate infertility, and they do not learn from unsuccessful concep-
tion attempts. On the basis of medical evidence, we fix the proportion of
infertile women at 5 percent.7
Occupation and labor supply.—In our model, several features describe an
“occupation” oit (which takes three values denoting whether an occupation
is “routine,” “abstract,” or “manual”). First, each occupation has a particu-
lar wage path, characterized by different log wage intercepts and different
returns to work skills (denoted xit). Second, occupations are characterized
by the pace with which skills depreciate through intermittency (atrophy).
Third, arrival rates of offers when out of work differ across occupations.
Finally, occupations differ in their amenity value with regard to children,
as in some occupations, women can better vary their work hours to care
for their children. By allowing for occupational choices, we build into our
model an important aspect of women’s career decisions, which has first
been emphasized by Polachek (1981). We extend Polachek’s formulation
by allowing these choices to be made in conjunction with fertility choices
and by considering the “child raising value” of occupations.8
In any occupation, individuals can work either full-time (FT ) or part-
time (PT ). They can also choose to be unemployed (U ) or out of the la-
bor force (OLF), and we record the choice in the variable lit. We assume
that offers for alternative occupations and working hours arrive at ran-
dom but that arrival rates differ according to current occupation and la-
bor supply status. We refer the reader to the Appendix for further detail
on functional forms. Furthermore, women who are working face an ex-
ogenous and constant probability of layoff d.7 Data from the United States indicate that about 8 percent of women aged 15–29 have
impaired fecundity (see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2002), although some
may give birth after treatment for infertility.
8 Goldin (2014) stresses this point as an important aspect of occupational choice.
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career costs of children 303Budget constraint.—The budget constraint of the household is given by
Ait11 5 1 1 rð ÞAit 1 net GIit ; hit , nitð Þ 2 cHHit
2 k ðageKit , nitÞIlit5F T ,PT ,nit >0,
(1)
where Ait is the stock of assets and r the interest rate (which we assume as
fixed and set at 4 percent). In our model, assets are accumulated for pre-
cautionary motives as individuals are risk averse and face shocks to wages,
labor market participation, and household size. Assets are used to fi-
nance periods out of the labor force, fluctuations in household earnings,
and costs associated with children and retirement. Households cannot
borrow against future income to finance the costs induced by having chil-
dren and need to delay fertility to accumulate sufficient assets (see also
Heckman and Mosso [2014] for a discussion of imperfect borrowing in
a model of parenting). Total household consumption is denoted as cHHit ,
which is equal to the woman’s own consumption, cit, scaled by the num-
ber of adults and children in the household.9 Further, we denote by GIit
the gross income of the household, which consists of the labor earnings
of the husband, the labor earnings of the wife if she works, unemploy-
ment benefits or maternity leave benefits if eligible, and government
transfers according to the number of children.10 If children are present
but the father has left the household, the father contributes to the house-
hold budget through child support.11 During retirement, women receive
retirement benefits, which are a fraction of their last earnings. Net in-
come net(GIit; hit, nit) is derived from gross income, using institutional
features of the German tax code, and is a function of the number of chil-
dren and the presence of a husband (where hit 5 1 if a husband is pres-
ent), as tax rates vary between singles and couples. Finally, k is a cost in-
curred if children are present and the mother decides to work and
includes the cost of child care. We assume it depends on the age of the
youngest child (denoted ageKit ) and the number of children, nit. We esti-
mate this cost along with the parameters of the model.9 We use a scale similar to the “OECDmodified scale,” where the “number of adult equiv-
alent” is equal to one plus 0.5 for a second adult and 0.3 for each child; see Hagenaars, de
Vos, and Zaidi (1994). As these consumption weights are derived for the average household
in OECD countries, they may not be pertinent for the population we study. We therefore es-
timate the weight of children while holding constant the weight of adults.
10 Unemployment benefits depend on past earnings, which in turn are functions of
the previous occupation, accumulated skills, and unobserved productivity. Individuals are
eligible for benefits if they had been working prior to becoming unemployed. Maternity
benefits consist of two components, a fixed one and a variable one, that depend on former
labor market status.
11 The father’s compulsory contribution is 15 percent of his income for each child; see
Oberlandesgerichts Düsseldorf (2005) for more detail.
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AllSkills and wages.—While working, individuals accumulate skills. Skills
are increased by one unit for each year of full-time work and by 0.5 unit
for each year of part-time work.12 When out of work, skills depreciate,
and the rate of atrophy rðxit , oitÞ < 1 depends on the occupation and
the previous level of skills:
xit11 5 xitr xit , oitð Þ,
r xit , oitð Þ 5 r1 oitð ÞIxit∈½0;5½ 1 r2 oitð ÞIxit∈½5;7½ 1 r3 oitð ÞIxit∈ 7,∞½½ , (2)
where r1, r2, and r3 are vectors of parameters, specific to each occupa-
tion, and Ij is an indicator variable taking the value of one if j is true
(i.e., if the level of skills xit falls in the interval in brackets). We thus allow
for career interruptions being more detrimental at career stages in which
learning is intense or individuals compete for key workplace positions, a
potentially important factor to understand the timing of fertility.13
Female full-time daily wages depend on skills, xit, occupation, oit, and
individual productivity f Pi :
ln wit 5 f
P
i 1 aO oitð Þ 1 aX oitð Þxit 1 aXX oitð Þx2it 1 hit , (3)
where hit is an independent and identically distributed (iid) shock to log
wages. The wage profile is specific to a given occupation, with different
intercepts and different returns to skills.14
Marriage, divorce, and husbands’ earnings.—Women’s probability of get-
ting married in each period depends on their age, skills, and taste for
children ( f Ci ). Conditional on being married, women face a probability
of divorce that depends on their age and the presence of children. The
functional forms for these probabilities are shown in the Appendix, Sec-
tion A. Our model therefore allows for the age of marriage to vary with
unobserved characteristics, where women with a higher taste for fertility
may marry at younger ages. To the extent that unobserved heterogeneity
such as differences in productivity, taste for children, or leisure affect la-
bor market attachment, these characteristics will also influence marital
status through the effect on skills.
Wemodel the earnings of the husband, earnhit , which capture both their
wages and labor supply. We assume that earnings depend on observed
characteristics of the woman, as in van der Klaauw (1996) or Sheran (2007),
(2)12 We do not consider occupation-specific skills as in the data we observe very few indi-
viduals switching occupation during the life cycle.
13 This extends the empirical literature that assumes constant depreciation rates across
occupations or career stages; see, e.g., Kim and Polachek (1994) and Albrecht et al. (1999).
We chose the nodes of 5 and 7 on the basis of results from reduced-form regressions.
14 As wage profiles are flat after 15 years of accumulated work experience, we assume
that there exists a threshold, x, beyond which the marginal effect of skills on wages is zero.
We estimate this threshold along with the other parameters.
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career costs of children 305which in our case include age and occupation. We extend these papers by




















where Ioit is an indicator variable equal to one if the wife is working in oc-
cupation j, and hhit is a shock assumed to be iid and normally distributed
with mean zero.15 As we allow for a rich set of characteristics, both ob-
served and unobserved, to influence marital status and husbands’ earn-
ings, our model captures essential ingredients of a marriage market with
assortative matching and differential marriage rates across women, while
at the same time remaining tractable.16 Husbands contribute to the in-
comeof the household, providing resources and insurance against income
or labor market shocks.
Conception.—If a woman decides to conceive a child, a child is born in
the next period with a probability pðageMit , f Fi Þ. This probability takes into
account potential infertility, although women donot know or learn about
it. Drawing on medical evidence, we allow the probability of conception
to decline with age.17 Note that a child can be conceived out of wedlock,
although this is uncommon in Germany during the period we consider.18
Dynamic choice.—At the start of each period, individuals take as given
the variables that form their state space Qit :
Qit 5 lit21, oit21, Ait21, hit21, age
M
it , xit , nit , age
K
it , ϒit , fif g:
The state space is composed of variables set at the end of the previous
period: labor supply lit21, occupation oit21, assets Ait21, and marital status
(presence of a husband)hit21. It also comprises variables updated at the
start of the period: age(ageMit ), skills xit, number of children (including
any newborn child)nit, and the age of the youngest child age
K
it . The state
space includes a vector of iid shocks to preferences affecting labormarket
status, occupation, and conception as well as income or earning shocks15 We estimate the variance of hhit using data on earnings for the spouses, including non-
employment spells, so that hhit takes into account unemployment shocks as well. We assume
that the shock to the husband’s earning is orthogonal—conditional on observables and a
fixed effect specified in eqq. (3) and (4)—to the shock to the woman’s wage. In the data,
the wage/earnings residuals within a household are weakly correlated with a coefficient of
20.04 and a standard deviation of 0.001.
16 Dynamic models of marriage markets and schooling or labor supply have been de-
rived by, e.g., Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009) and Eckstein and Lifshitz (2015).
17 Khatamee and Rosenthal (2002) estimate that a woman has a 90 percent chance of
conceiving within a year at age 20, a 70 percent chance at age 30, and a 6 percent chance
at age 45. After age 50, the probability of conception is almost zero.
18 We do not allow for conception errors, as in Sheran (2007), as we do not have such
information. But our model allows for shocks to preferences regarding conception, so that
two seemingly similar women may differ in their decision to conceive.
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All(which we collect in a vector ϒit), and the different dimensions of ex ante
heterogeneity, collected in the vector fi.
The value function for individual i in period t is given by
Vt Qitð Þ 5 max
bit ,cit ,oit ,litf g
u cit , oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it , ϒit , fið Þ
1 bEtVt11 Qit11ð Þ,
(5)
where b is a discount factor, and Et is the expectation operator conditional
on information in period t. The expectation of the individual is over the
vector of future preference and income shocks ϒit11 and future shocks
to marital status.
In each period the individual chooses whether to conceive or not (de-
noted by the indicator variable bit), her consumption (or equivalently house-
hold consumption), occupation oit, and labor market status lit. The choice
of occupation and labor market status becomes effective at the end of the
period.
Utility is derived from her own consumption cit, labor market status lit
(which reflects the amount of leisure time available), the amenity value
of an occupation oit, and the number of children nit (we abstract from
modeling the quality of children). We write the utility function as
uit 5 u1 cit , lit ; nit , f
L
ið Þ 1 u2 nit ; f Ci , ageKit , lit , oit , hitð Þ 1 u3 bit , ϒitð Þ: (6)
The utility function has three parts. The first subfunction is the utility
derived from consumption and leisure. We allow for curvature in the util-
ity function over consumption to allow for risk aversion by specifying a
constant relative risk-averse function. The utility of consumption is in-
teracted with leisure (labor supply), as in Attanasio et al. (2008), the taste
for leisure, as well as the number of children.
The second subutility is the utility of children. The utility a woman de-
rives from children depends on her taste for children and on four fur-
ther factors: the age of the youngest child, ageKit , labor supply, lit, occupa-
tion, oit, and her marital status, hit. The age of the youngest child reflects
that leisure may be particularly valuable when children are young. The
specification also allows for complementarity between children and lei-
sure. These features help explain why many mothers take time off from
the labor market.19 Occupation may affect the marginal utility of chil-
dren as some occupations may be more demanding and impose con-19 We do not model child quality, as the goal of our analysis is the study of the careers of
women and not the production of child quality per se. See Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall
(2014) for a model of child quality and parental inputs, which, however, does not consider
fertility choices, savings, occupational choices, and depreciation of skills. With data on la-
bor supply and fertility, our formulation is observationally equivalent to models in which
mothers derive utility over child quality, which is produced with parental time inputs.
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career costs of children 307straints for working mothers. Finally, marital status is part of the utility
function to allow for the possibility that raising children imposes less of
a utility cost if a partner is present.
The third subutility collects preference shocks pertaining to the choice
of conception (bit). We describe in the Appendix, Section C, in detail the
functional form for the subutility functions.
Labor market choices are made until 60, at the age at which women
retire and live an additional 20 years, deriving utility from consumption,
leisure, and children. During that period, they finance consumption from
retirement benefits and by decumulating assets. Choices are made under
the constraints detailed above, as well as some additional institutional con-
straints, which we describe in the Appendix, Section D. For instance,
women who are out of the labor force cannot apply for unemployment
benefits, and pregnant women in employment have the option to return
to their previous occupation after their maternity leave (although not nec-
essarily at the same wage, as skills depreciate when out of work).
Initial choice of occupation.—At time t5 0, women enter apprenticeship
training, typically around age 15 or 16, and decide on a specific training
occupation oi0 by comparing the expected flow of utility for each occupa-
tional choice with the current cost, which depends on the region of res-
idence Ri and the year of labor market entry (Yeari), as well as a prefer-
ence shock, qio, drawn from an extreme value distribution and specific
to each possible occupation o. These costs arise from temporary or local
shortages of training positions in particular occupations, and we use those
as instruments to identify the choice of occupation. The apprenticeship
training lasts 3 years, so the payoff is received six periods later (as a period
in our model lasts for half a year):
oi0 5 argmax
o
½b6E0V6 Qi6ð Þ 2 cost o, Ri, Yearið Þ 2 qio : (7)
We do not model choices during the training periods. Training regula-
tions in Germany commit firms to fulfilling the entire period of the ap-
prenticeship contract, so individuals cannot be fired. We assume that
women begin making choices about fertility once they have completed
their training.20B. Estimation: Method and MomentsThe model is estimated using the method of simulated moments (see
Pakes and Pollard 1989; Duffie and Singleton 1993), which allows us to20 Teenage pregnancy rates are very low in Germany. For instance, in 1998, only 1.3 per-
cent of women between 15 and 19 gave birth, compared to 5.2 percent in the United States
(seeUNICEF 2001) and 4.7 percent between 15 and 18 in theUnited Kingdom (see http://
www.fpa.org.uk/professionals/factsheets/teenagepregnancy).
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Allcombine information fromdifferent data sources on career choices, wages,
savings, and fertility decisions over the life cycle. The method also allows
us to address time aggregation, through simulations, as the sample frames
of our data sets vary, from semiannual (in the IAB data) to annual fre-
quencies (in the GSOEP).
In this approach, the model is solved by backward induction (value
function iterations) on the basis of an initial set of parameters and then
simulated for individuals over their life cycles.21 The simulated data pro-
vide a panel data set used to construct moments that can be matched to
moments obtained from the observed data. Using a quadratic loss func-
tion, the parameters of the model are then chosen such that the simu-
lated moments are as close as possible to the observed moments. Be-
cause our model focuses on describing life cycle choices, we remove
regional means and an aggregate time trend from all our moments.22
The method of simulated moments yields consistent estimates. How-
ever, as shown by Eisenhauer, Heckman, and Mosso (2015), its finite dis-
tance properties depend on the choice of moments, the number of sim-
ulations, and the weightingmatrix; we follow their suggestion and choose
both static and dynamic moments. To obtain a smoother criterion func-
tion, we weight themoments with a diagonal matrix that contains the var-
iances of the observed moments.
The full list of moments used to identify the model is displayed in ta-
ble 2, grouped by the choices they identify, that is, labor supply and oc-
cupational choices, wages, savings, fertility, and marital status. In each of
these categories, we rely on simple statistics that ensure that the model
reproduces the basic trends and levels in the real data. These moments
include variables such as the proportion of women in each occupation,
average wages, hours of work, number of children, and savings rates, all
computed at different ages ranging from 15 to 55.23 We further describe
fertility choices by ages at first and second births and their heterogeneity
by including centiles of the age at first and second births in our list of
moments.21 We refer the reader to the online appendix for a discussion on the numerical solution
of the model.
22 Removing regional and aggregate effects when calculating moments implies that we
are relying on DiD variations to identify our model. In other words, the model is not iden-
tified from pure cross-sectional variations or time-series variations that could introduce
spurious correlation. An alternative choice would be tomodel regional differences together
with a choice of residence, which would be infeasible within our framework. Kennan and
Walker (2011) model location choices in a simpler setting.
23 We follow the cohorts in our main data from age 15 to 40. To completely characterize
their life cycle, however, we also use supplemental data from slightly older cohorts to con-
struct moments that describe wages and labor supply at ages 45, 50, and 55. We verify that
at age 40, the labor supply and wages of these older cohorts are very similar to those of the
younger ones.
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TABLE 2
Moments Used in the Estimations
Moments Data Set No. Moments
A. Labor Supply and
Occupational Choice
Proportion of full-time work, by age and initial occupation IAB 25
Proportion of part-time work, by age and initial occupation IAB 20
Proportionofoutof labor force,byageandinitialoccupation IAB 20
Work experience, by age IAB 5
Annual transition rate between occupations IAB 9
Transition rates between labor market status,
by occupation IAB 48
Proportion work, by number of children GSOEP 15
Proportion part-time work, no child GSOEP 5
Proportion in each occupation, initial and at all ages IAB 6
Initial choice of occupation, by region and time period IAB 440
B. Wages
Wage by age and initial occupation IAB 21
OLS regression of log wage on experience, by occupation IAB 9
OLS regression of log wage on age, number
of children, occupation GSOEP 12
OLS regression of log wage on past and future wages IAB 3
OLS regression of log wage for interrupted spells
on duration and experience IAB 14
OLS regression of wage growth around interrupted
work spells by occupation IAB 10
OLS regression of husbands’ log earnings
on women’s characteristics GSOEP 6
Variance of residual of log wage on occupation,
age, work hours GSOEP 1
Proportion of women with log wage residual
< 1 standard deviation GSOEP 1
C. Savings
OLS regressions savings rate on age, occupation,
number of children EVS 24
D. Fertility and Marriage
Proportion with no children, by age GSOEP 5
Proportion with one child, by age GSOEP 5
Centiles of age at first birth GSOEP 10
Centiles of age at second birth GSOEP 10
Number of children at age 38 GSOEP 3
Average age at first birth, by current occupation GSOEP 3
Proportion of childbirth within marriage GSOEP 1
OLS regression of fertility on age and initial occupation GSOEP 5
Instrumental variable regression of fertility on age
and initial occupation (instrumented) GSOEP 5
Mean of residual of number of children on age,
by wage residual GSOEP 2
Proportion married, by age GSOEP 5
OLS regression marriage on age, experience, past marital
status, occupation, and fertility residual GSOEP 15
Total 763This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditio January 18, 20
ns (http://wwwNote.—IAB: Institut fuer Arbeitsmarkt-und Berufsforschung. GSOEP: German Socio-
Economic Panel. EVS: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe. Instruments for initial oc-
cupation in instrumental variable regressions are the interactions between region of resi-
dence at age 16 with year of birth.18 08:14:13 AM
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AllIn addition, we add conditional moments, which relate the main out-
come variables to other endogenous variables, for either the same period
or adjacent periods. Eisenhauer et al. (2015) argue that such moments
are crucial to identify the parameters of dynamic models such as ours.24
Information contained in regressions of log wages on career interrup-
tions contribute to the identification of the atrophy rate parameters in
equation (2), as in Polachek (1981). More specifically, we use informa-
tion from regressions of the change in log wages for individuals who in-
terrupt their career on the duration of the interruption, dummies for
experience levels, occupational groups, and the interaction of duration
and experience. This information alone is not sufficient to identify the
atrophy parameters because of the nonrandom selection into maternity
and more generally into nonworking spells. However, by matching the
simulated moments to those obtained from the observational data, our
model, which specifies the process through which these choices aremade,
allows us to identify the underlying structural parameters. We follow here
similar identification schemes that have been used in previous literature
(see, e.g., Del Boca et al. 2014).
Ourmodel also allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the level of wages
(ability), as in equation (3), and in the utility derived from children.25 We
model the heterogeneity as a mass point distribution and allow for a corre-
lation between both dimensions. We use discrete mass points, which are
estimated together with the relative proportion in the sample in a similar
way as in Heckman and Singer (1984). To identify the proportion of in-
dividuals in each ability “type,” we proceed in several steps. We first regress
log wages on experience and occupation and compute wage residuals for
each individual. This residual contains information on unobserved ability,
f Pi . We then use the cross-sectional variance of these wage residuals as a
moment. We also regress the number of children on age to compute a
fertility residual, which contains information about the unobserved taste
for children, f Ci , and we correlate it with the wage residual to provide in-
formation on the correlation between ability and desired fertility.
We construct these conditional moments from different data sets and
use for eachmoment the data set that contains the most precise informa-
tion. For instance, moments pertaining to wages and labor supply are
computed from the administrative IAB data. Information on fertility is
gathered from the GSOEP and information on savings rates from the
EVS. In total, we rely on 763 moments to identify our model. The online
appendix provides further evidence on the identification of the model.24 For instance, dynamic moments we use link current wages to past and future wages, or
past labor supply or fertility decisions, current labor supply to previous labor supply, and
current savings with past fertility decisions.
25 As explained earlier, we group together heterogeneity in ability and taste for leisure.
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career costs of children 311C. Model FitOverall, the model fits the sample moments well in an economic sense.
However, because of our very large sample (we observe 2.7 million work
spells and earnings), our moments are estimated with very high preci-
sion, which leads, not surprisingly, to statistical rejection of global equal-
ity of estimated and simulated moments. For instance, the proportion of
women working full-time at age 30 is 37.5 percent in the data, while the
model prediction is 37.1 percent. Statistically, the equality of these two
moments is nonetheless rejected, with a t-statistic of 3.8.26 Locally, how-
ever, we cannot reject the equality of the observed and simulated mo-
ments at the 95 percent confidence level in 53 percent of the cases, de-
spite our large sample. Furthermore, the model matches trends in labor
supply and work hours well, as well as the number of children and spac-
ing of births by age. It is also able to match wage profiles by age and ini-
tial occupation, the savings rate by age, and the coefficients of a regression
of log wage on work experience by occupation. The model also replicates
closely the dynamic moments. For instance, a regression of our simulated
data for log wages on the lead and lagged log wages gives results very simi-
lar to the ones in the data (respectively, 0.51 vs. 0.53 and 0.48 vs. 0.46; see
table A8 in the online appendix). To economize on space in themain text,
we refer the reader to the online appendix for a detailed presentation of
the model fit and an extended set of tables.IV. Results
A. Estimated ParametersTo describe wages, hours of work, occupational choices, the number of
children, the spacing of births, and savings decisions over the life cycle,
we estimate a structure that is defined by a total of 73 parameters.27 We
now discuss subsets of these parameters.B. Atrophy Rates, Wages, and Amenity
Values by OccupationWe display in panel A of table 3 the atrophy rates, measured as the value
of skill loss resulting from a 1-year work interruption, which we allow to26 The J-statistic for the overall fit of the model is equal to 123,352, which implies the
rejection of the equality of predicted and observed moments at any confidence level. The
chi-square critical value at the 5 percent level and 670 degrees of freedom is equal to 731.
The equality of the predicted and observed moments would not be rejected were the sam-
ple size 1 percent of the current sample size, which would still be larger than the sample
sizes typically used in structural models.
27 In addition, the initial choice of occupation, allowing for a fully interacted model with
regional and time effects in the cost function (see eq. [7]), is defined by 88 parameters.
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Allvary by level of skills and by occupation (see eq. [2]). As skills accumulate
in the same way as work experience but depreciate when out of work, a
skill level of x is equivalent to x years of uninterrupted work experience,
and we report the atrophy rates at 3, 5, and 10 years.
In routine occupations, atrophy rates are low and vary between 0.06
percent and 0.6 percent. In contrast, in abstract occupations, atrophy
rates are far higher and vary substantially over the career cycle (between
0.1 percent and 6.9 percent per year), while manual jobs take an inter-
mediate position. In both types of occupations, atrophy rates are highest
at about 6 years of uninterrupted work experience, suggesting that in-
termittency is far more costly at intermediate career stages, possibly be-
cause of differing learning intensity over the career cycle, and important
career steps being decided at those career points.28 An uninterrupted
work experience of 6 years corresponds, on average, to an age of 26 years,TABLE 3
Occupation-Speciﬁc Parameters
Parameter Routine Abstract Manual
A. Atrophy Rates Parameters
(Annual Depreciation Rates)
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career costs of children 313which is when many women find it desirable to have children. Fertility
decisions are therefore likely to be affected far more by career concerns
in abstract (and to some extent in manual) jobs than in routine occupa-
tions. This is in line with the evidence in table 1 on the age at first birth
across occupational groups. In addition, the nonlinear evolution of atro-
phy rates in these occupations, being highest at midcareer stages, adds a
further important (and so far largely ignored) consideration when consid-
ering occupational choices of women and how these interact with desired
fertility.29
In panel B of table 3, we display the parameters of the (log) wage as a
function of uninterrupted work experience (defined as in eq. [3]), which
represent average treatment effects of working full-time in a given occu-
pation.30 The estimates suggest that wage returns to human capital (the
constant terms) are highest in abstract occupations. Furthermore, while
wage increases are similar across occupational groups in the early years,
wage profiles are less concave in abstract occupations and continue to
grow at a faster pace at higher total work experience.31 Thus, interrup-
tions at midcareer in abstract jobs are more costly not only because of
higher atrophy rates but also because of considerably higher opportunity
costs as individuals forgo earnings while not in work.
An additional dimension when balancing occupational choice with la-
bor supply and fertility decisions, besides atrophy rates and opportunity
costs, is the amenity value of an occupation with regard to children (which
can be interpreted as the ease with which women in these occupations can
combine work with child raising).32 We present estimates of these amenity
values, normalized to be zero for routine occupations, in panel C of ta-
ble 3. The figures show that—in comparison to routine jobs—abstract jobs
are least desirable when children are present. Our estimates imply that if
abstract and manual occupations had the same amenity value as routine
ones, the proportion of women opting for abstract ormanual occupations29 Contrasting these estimates with those from simple (fixed-effects) regressions as in
Polachek (1981) and Kim and Polachek (1994), obtained by first simulating life cycle ca-
reers using our model and then regressing changes in log wages following interruptions
on the time out of work by occupation, and allowing for nonlinearities, leads to estimates
that understate the role of atrophy but reproduce the ranking across occupations. This is
mainly due to such regressions ignoring that those who return to work are positively se-
lected, as they are more likely to have drawn a positive wage shock, something that is built
into our model and estimation.
30 Compared to the ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients shown in table A8 in the
online appendix, these structural parameters are “causal,” taking account of selection; fur-
ther, they refer to a measure of skills that, unlike real experience, depreciates when the in-
dividual is out of work.
31 For instance, after 10 years of uninterrupted work experience, wages in abstract jobs
increase by about 2 percent more per additional year than in the other two occupations.
32 These parameters are identified through variations in labor supply of women with and
without children in various occupations, which cannot be explained by differences in atro-
phy rates, opportunity costs, or selection.
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Allwould increase by 5 percent. The amenity of part-time work—an option
chosen by many mothers in our data—is likewise lower in abstract jobs,
as the second row of this panel shows. Our estimates imply that if women
in abstract jobs had the same amenity value for part-time jobs as in routine
ones, the proportion of part-time work in abstract jobs would be 7 percent
higher by the age of 30. These estimates point at a complex interaction
between career and fertility decisions. Women in abstract occupations face
higher atrophy rates, have higher opportunity costs of leaving the labor
market, and have a higher utility cost of handling children and work. This
will induce women with a higher desired fertility to choose more often ca-
reers in routine occupations and to have children earlier. On the other
hand, as children are costly, higher wages in abstract jobs—and the pros-
pect of marrying a better husband—make this career also desirable, as as-
sets can be built up faster to smooth consumption when children arrive.
We illustrate these trade-offs below.C. Utility of ConsumptionTable 4 presents estimated parameters that characterize consumption
decisions. The estimate of the discount factor (first row) is 0.96 annually,
similar to values in the previous literature (e.g., Cooley and Prescott 1995).
Our estimate for the curvature of the utility function (or the relative risk
aversion, row 2) is close to two, again a common value in the literature.
Row 3 displays the estimated weights children have in the consumption
equivalence scale. This parameter is important as it drives not only fertility
choices but also savings choices to smooth consumption over the life cycle.
Our estimate is close to 0.4, slightly higher than the one in the “modified
OECD scale,” which is equal to 0.3. The last two rows present the estimates
of the cost of child care, distinguishing between the age of the youngest
child. These are estimated to be €31 per day for infants and €12 per day
for older children.33
The consumption costs of children and the cost of child care suggest
that households may gain from smoothing consumption by anticipating
births. We illustrate this in figure 2, which shows that savings rates start to
increase at least 4 years prior to birth and decline afterward. Hence, sav-
ings are likely an important factor to understand fertility decisions and
how these are affected by policy interventions, something that we inves-
tigate in Section IV.G.33 The average cost of day care in Germany is estimated by the OECD to represent about
11 percent of net family income (http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF3.4%20Childcare
%20support%20-%20290713.pdf), which amounts to about €15 per day. Our estimated pa-
rameter also takes into account other expenses linked to work and children such as trans-
portation.
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career costs of children 315D. Unobserved HeterogeneityPanel A in table 5 lists the parameters that characterize individual types.
As explained above, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity, with two dif-
ferent levels of ability/taste for leisure and two types of preferences to-
ward fertility. Columns LA/HC, LA/LC, HA/LC, and HA/HC refer to
combinations of low ability (LA)—high ability (HA) and low taste for chil-
dren (LC)—high taste for children (HC) types. Note that as we explain in
Section III, we allow groups with different ability to have different tastesFIG. 2.—Savings rates around first and second births, model prediction. Computed
through simulations of the model, involving 12,000 draws.TABLE 4
Estimated Parameters: Consumption Decision and Cost of Children
Parameter Estimate
Annual discount factor .959 (.00028)
Constant relative risk aversion utility 1.98 (.0021)
Weight of children in consumption equivalence scale .392 (.00167)
Cost of working, if children, age ≤ 6 (€ per day) 31.1 (.36)
Cost of working, if children, age > 6 (€ per day) 12.6 (.24)This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 201
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.Note.—Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.8 08:14:13 AM
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Allfor leisure. The first row reports the proportions for the four type combi-
nations in our data. The next two rows show the differences in log wages
across ability types and the utility of leisure, where we have normalized
LA-type women to zero. High-ability women earn wages that are 0.14 log
points higher than those of low-ability women and have a lower utility of
leisure (by about 26 percent). Rows 4 and 5 display the utility of children
for the different categories, showing that women with a high taste for chil-
dren (HC) obtain positive utility for both the first and second child, while
LC types derive a positive utility only for the first child.34 The correlation
between taste for children and ability is close to zero, suggesting that it is
not the combination of high ability and low taste for children that leads
women in better-paid careers to have fewer children; rather, the choice of
steeper career paths for these women induces considerable costs through
the sacrifice of fertility.
Panel B, which reports estimated type-specific fertility rates and pro-
portions in the different occupations, shows that women with a low taste
for children have, on average, about one child, while women with a high
taste have 1.9 children. Interestingly, we do not find much difference inTABLE 5
Estimated Parameters: Unobserved Ability and Utility of Children
Parameter LA/HC LA/LC HA/HC HA/LC
A. Individual Type (Ability/Fertility)
Proportion in sample .125 .174 .309 .393
(8.05e–05) (.0621) (.00775) (.0621)
Log wage intercept 0 0 .145 .145
. . . . . . (.0026) (.0026)
Utility of leisure 0 0 .257 .257
. . . . . . (.0032) (.0032)
Utility of one child .484 .158 .484 .158
(.0056) (.014) (.0056) (.014)
Utility of two children 1.28 22.04 1.28 22.04
(.00026) (1.3) (.00026) (1.3)
Corr(ability, desired fertility) .02
B. Outcome by Type
Total fertility 1.88 .953 1.88 .951
Proporton in routine occupation .3 .231 .301 .232
Proportion in abstract occupation .404 .509 .407 .508
Proportion in manual occupation .296 .26 .292 .2634 As the model also allows for idiosy
with low permanent taste for children (
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career costs of children 317terms of total fertility with respect to ability. The last three rows in the
table show the proportion of each type in the three different occupa-
tional groups, providing evidence of sorting on ability and desired fertil-
ity: close to 50 percent of women with a low taste for children opt for an
abstract occupation, while routine occupations are relatively more fre-
quent for women with a high taste for fertility.35E. Career Costs of FertilityWe now use our model to assess the career costs of children, which is how
much a woman would gain in monetary terms if she decided not to have
children. We evaluate these costs by simulating life cycle outcomes under
two scenarios. First, we simply match the model to the fertility pattern in
our data, which serves as our baseline scenario. Second, we set the con-
ception probability to zero, so that a woman knows ex ante that no chil-
dren will be conceived and will therefore base all her decisions on that
knowledge. This includes the initial choice of occupation, as well as la-
bor market decisions and savings over the entire life cycle.36 We first pre-
sent the differences in career paths for the two scenarios along various
dimensions. We then compute the cost of children as the net present
value of the difference in life cycle earnings at age 15 between the two
scenarios.37
Occupational choice and labor supply.—Figure 3a displays the differences
in occupational choices at age 15 between the two scenarios. It shows
that the expectation about future fertility affects the choice of occupa-
tion even before fertility decisions are made: a woman who knows that
she will remain childless is less likely to work in routine andmanual occu-
pations (by about 3 percent and 2 percent, respectively) and more likely
to work in occupations involving mainly abstract tasks (by about 5 per-
cent). This is an important insight, suggesting that key career decisions
are affected by the expectation about future fertility, possibly long before
fertility decisions are made, and implies that some of the career costs of
children are determined even before a child is born. Below we will assess
the magnitude of these costs.
Figure 3b plots the difference in labor supply over the life cycle between
the two scenarios. In the no-fertility scenario, a woman is more likely to
work at any age: the difference increases fromabout 10percent inher early35 We report other parameter estimates as well as the arrival rates of offers in different
states in the online appendix.
36 Note that, as the probability of marriage and the type of husband depend on endog-
enous choices such as occupation and skills, a change in fertility will also affect women
along this margin. We find, however, that these indirect effects are small.
37 As we are interested in the career costs for a single individual, we compute partial equi-
librium results. The results might differ if all women chose not to have children.
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All20s to 30 percent in her mid-30s. It then declines to about 10 percent, as
women who had children gradually return to the labor market. Hence,
the difference in labor supply over the life cycle is an important compo-
nent of the overall costs of children, as we demonstrate below. Fertility
affects labor supply also at the intensive margin: Figure 3c shows that chil-
dren increase the probability of working part-time (conditional on work-FIG. 3.—Effect of no fertility. The different panels display the difference in outcomes
between a baseline scenario and one in which a woman knows that she is infertile.This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
career costs of children 319ing), and the difference increases with age to reach about 25 percentage
points between ages 35 and 45. Interestingly, and comparing figures 3b
and 3c, women who return to the labor market in their late 30s and early
40s tend to remain inpart-time jobs, compared to the nonfertility scenario.
This feature comes from the fact that women derive a higher utility of lei-
sure when children are present but need to work to finance higher con-
sumption needs. The effect of fertility on women’s labor supply over the
life cycle also has a stark impact on work experience: our simulations show
that by the time they retire at age 60, mothers have, on average, 22 percent
less work experience per child.
Wages and selection over the life cycle.—Figure 3d plots the deviation of
wages in the no-fertility scenario from the baseline scenario. Here, and in
the simulations below, we report average daily (rather than hourly) wages
conditional on working. Hence, differences across scenarios result from
differences in skills, the number of hours worked per day, occupational
choices, and differences in the ability composition of women who choose
to work. The figure shows that, while at age 20, the daily wage in the no-
fertility scenario is only about 0.03 log points higher than in the baseline
scenario, this difference rises to 0.22 log points by age 40 and then slightly
declines when women return to the labor market. Hours of work contrib-
ute only partly to these differences in daily wages. We find that by age 40,
the full-time wage in the no-fertility scenario is, on average, 10 percent
higher than in the baseline scenario.
One reason for this difference in wages is composition. There is a long
tradition in economics—dating back to the seminal work of Heckman
(1974) and including work by Blau and Kahn (1996), Blundell et al.
(2007), Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), and Olivetti and Petrongolo
(2008)—of evaluating the selection of women into the labor market.
Our model allows us to assess the role of fertility decisions in shaping
the ability composition of women in the work force over the life cycle.
In figure 3e, we present the ratios of working women of low versus high
ability over the life cycle under the two scenarios. In the no-fertility sce-
nario, this ratio is close to 0.43 and relatively stable, while in the fertility
scenario, the composition of working women changes substantially over
the career cycle. While at age 20 the ratio is equal to 0.42, it decreases to
0.37 by age 35, when low-ability women are less likely to work than high-
ability women, and rises again toward the end of the working life as
mothers return to the labor market.38 Hence, selection into the labor
market due to fertility is time varying and depends on both fertility
choices and the timing of births. Part of the rise in the wage differential
in figure 3d is therefore due to this dynamic selection, with the difference38 As shown above, this is not because low-ability women have more children, but rather
because they are less likely to come back to work once their children are older.
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Allin wages due to differential ability ( f Pi ) at age 35 being equal to about 0.01
log points out of a total difference of 0.22 log points.
Decomposing the net present value of fertility choices.—The graphs presented
above show various aspects of the career costs of fertility in terms of oc-
cupational choice, labor supply, and wages. We summarize these costs
by calculating their net present value (NPV) at the start of the career
(at age 15) taking account of all earnings, unemployment, andmaternity
benefits (wsit , b
s
U ,it , and b
s
M ,it), where the index s5 F,NF stands for the base-
line (F ) and the no-fertility scenario (NF ). Defining an indicator vari-
able Ijsit , which is equal to one if j is true under scenario s, the net present
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We evaluate the relative costs of children by computing 1 2 NPVNF=NPVF ,
using an annual discount factor of b 5 0.95. These costs reflect the dif-
ference in earnings, labor supply, and occupational choice induced by
the presence of children. On the basis of this calculation, and compar-
ing the baseline scenario with the no-fertility scenario, the overall costs
of children are close to 35 percent of the net present value of income at
age 15 (see table 6).
To better understand the sources of these costs, we isolate two compo-
nents: the contribution of labor supply and the contribution of wages
(see panel A in table 6). The first component is obtained by fixing wages
at the scenario with children, while computing the difference in terms of
labor supply for women with and without children. The second compo-
nent fixes labor supply for the no-children scenario and computes the
difference in wages for women with and without children.39 According
to this decomposition, about three-quarters of the costs (i.e., 27 percent
of the total 35.3 percent overall reduction in lifetime income) result from
differences in the labor supply over the life cycle, while about one-quarter
result from differences in wages. Thus, although wages are an important
component of the cost of children, more important are unearned wages
of women who drop out of the labor force for considerable periods over
their career.
In panel B of table 6, we provide two decompositions that break down
the contribution of wages into occupational choice and atrophy when out
of work and a respective residual term (“other factors”). The figures in
the table show that the overall contribution of atrophy to the lower wage
in the fertility scenario is about 20 percent, or 5 percent of the total life
cycle earnings difference in the fertility versus the no-fertility scenario.39 As in the standard Oaxaca-type decompositions, there are two alternative reference
groups. In the table, we present estimates based on the average of the two.
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career costs of children 321Occupational choices at the beginning of the career, and before any fer-
tility decision is made, represent 19 percent of the overall costs induced
through wages, indicating that a substantial portion of the wage-induced
career costs of children is already determined before fertility decisions
are made, through occupational choices conditioned on expected fertil-
ity pattern.
Table 7 displays the costs of fertility of having one or two children (in
terms of net present value at age 15), where we allow the spacing of births
to differ. The figures in the table show that the cost of a second child is
lower than the cost of the first child. For instance, a first child at age 20
induces total career costs of 31 percent compared to a scenario without
children. A second child conceived at age 22 increases these costs to
36 percent. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Bertrand, Gol-
din, and Katz (2010), who also find that the cost of a second child ismuch
lower than that of the first. The cost of a second child is increasing in
the spacing of births, as it prolongs the time the mother spends out of
the labor market. The costs of children are also decreasing in the age
at birth, for two reasons. First, as we measure the discounted costs, more
distant costs are valued less. Second, older mothers have time to establish
themselves in the labor market and accumulate sufficient human capi-
tal, which lowers the depreciation rate (see table 3, panel A). The fact that
children impose a lower cost for older mothers does not imply that it is
optimal to have children late, however, as women also derive utility from
their children. The optimal timing of births is therefore a trade-off be-
tween the various costs of children and their utility.TABLE 6
Career Cost of Children: Percentage Loss in Net Present Value





A. Oaxaca Decomposition of Total Cost
Labor supply contribution 227%
Wage contribution 28.5%
B. Oaxaca Decomposition of Wage Contributions
Contribution of atrophy 21.8%
Contribution of other factors 26.7%
Contribution of occupation 21.6%
Contribution of other factors 27%This content downloaded fr
All use subject to University of Chicago PNote.—The career costs are evaluated using simulations and comparing the estimated
model with a scenario in which the woman knows ex ante that she cannot have children.
The costs are computed as the net present value of female incomes, including all wages,
unemployment benefits, and maternity benefits in the calculations. The discount factor
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AllF. Fertility and the Gender GapHaving shown that fertility leads to a sizable reduction in life cycle earn-
ings and affects women’s wage profiles throughout their careers, we now
examine the extent to which the gender gap in earnings can be explained
by fertility. To do so, we compare the women studied here to men of sim-
ilar qualifications.40 Again, we compute this difference for the average
daily (rather than hourly) wage, which we believe is themost appropriate
measure because it includes the change from full-time to part-time work
as an important margin of fertility adjustment (see fig. 3c).
In figure 3f, we show the observed daily wages for working males (solid
line) and females (dashed line) by age, as well as the predicted profile
for females from our model (dotted line). The observed and predicted
wages for females are very similar, illustrating that the model fits the
data well. Whereas men’s daily wages increase monotonically with age,
women’s wages in the baseline scenario increase up to age 27 but then de-
crease and begin increasing again only after age 38. The overall gap in-
creases as women reduce the number of hours worked between ages 25
and 45 and then return to the labor market with lower labor market expe-
rience and depreciated skills once their children are older.
To assess the contribution of fertility to the gender wage gap, we com-
pute, as above, the counterfactual wage profile (conditional on working)
of a woman who remains childless and conditions on that knowledge
from the start of her career, which in figure 3f is labeled “Predicted Fe-
males, No Fertility.” The gender gap closes by about 0.2 log points whenTABLE 7
Career Cost of Children: Timing and Spacing of Births
Only One
Child (%)
Age at Second Birth (%)
Age at First Birth 22 24 26 28 30
20 231.4 236.4 236.6 236.6 237 236.9
22 230.2 . . . 234.6 234.8 234.8 235.2
24 228.1 . . . . . . 232.2 232.3 232.3
26 226.0 . . . . . . . . . 229.8 229.8
28 224.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . 22740 These are men belo
or intermediate seconda
labor market entry, and w
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career costs of children 323women are in their 30s, which corresponds to about a third of the over-
all gap.41G. The Effect of Pro-Fertility Policies on Fertility
and Women’s CareersIn many countries, fertility is encouraged in the form of tax relief or
transfers. A stream of literature has evolved on the effects of such poli-
cies on fertility and sometimes on labor supply.42 Some of this research,
which typically identifies these effects based on policy changes, nonline-
arities in the tax and transfer system, regional variation, and/or changes
or differences in entitlements across family characteristics, reports con-
siderable effects on total fertility. The focus of this literature, however,
tends to be limited to short-run responses of fertility because of two im-
portant problems: first, it is difficult in many data sets to track women
affected by such policies over an extended period, and until the comple-
tion of their fertility cycle. Second, and more importantly, because data
become contaminated over time by other factors that affect the fertility
and careers of particular birth cohorts, making a causal statement about
the effect of a policy some years after its implementation requires restric-
tive assumptions. Hence, extant studies pay little attention to long-term
consequences and how fertility behavior is affected at the extensive and
intensive margins.43 Yet, long-run effects of policy changes and the way
they affect behavior of different cohorts are very important for the eval-
uation of such policies. Any policy change affects different cohorts dif-
ferently, depending on where women are in their career and fertility cy-41 These findings are in line with those of Bertrand et al. (2010), who, using different
techniques, show that fertility-induced differences in the labor supply of MBAs explain a
large part of the male-female annual earnings differential, although our population of
women is, on average, less skilled. See also Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985) and Goldin
and Katz (2002), who illustrate the impact of fertility shocks on labor market participation
and wages.
42 See, e.g., Cohen et al. (2013), who investigate the effect of Israel’s child subsidy pro-
gram on fertility; Laroque and Salanie (2014), who study the impact of child subsidies in
France on total fertility and labor supply; Milligan (2005), who investigates the impact of a
new lump-sum transfer to families that have a child in Quebec; Sinclair, Boymal, and De
Silva (2012), who analyze the effect of a similar policy on fertility in Australia; Haan and
Wrohlich (2011), who estimate the effect of child care subsidies on fertility and employ-
ment in Germany; Lalive and Zweimüller (2009), who investigate the effects of parental
leave policy on fertility in Austria; and Kearney (2004), who studies the impact on fertility
of caps on child benefits paid for an additional child.
43 Two notable exceptions are Parent andWang (2007) and Kim (2014). Parent andWang
follow a cohort of Canadian women over their fertility cycle and find that the long-run re-
sponse is low compared to the short-run response. Kim studies the long-run impact of changes
in the child allowance policy in Quebec (see also Milligan 2005). He finds a small or no per-
manent impact on fertility.
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Allcle when the policy is implemented. While young women about to enter
the labor market can adjust not only their fertility behavior but also their
occupational choices and entire career paths to the policy change, older
women, having alreadymademost career and savings decisions, have fewer
possibilities of adjustment. The effects of the policy will thus change over
time as more women condition on it when making their fertility and ca-
reer choices. At the same time, transfer policies may affect decisions other
than fertility, such as labor supply, occupational choices, savings decisions,
and human capital investments. These “secondary” effects, despite being
important for assessing the full impact of these policies, are hardly investi-
gated.
To help fill this void, we use our life cycle model to evaluate the effect
of a policy that provides a cash transfer at birth of €6,000. Policies of this
type have been implemented in different countries, as illustrated in the
above-mentioned literature. We show the effect of the policy on the prob-
ability of giving birth, by age, in figure 4a, comparing the behavior of
women under the baseline and the policy. The difference in the probabil-
ity is positive at first and then negative, showing that the policy induces
women to have their children earlier, but it has little effect on the overall
number of children per woman.
Next we investigate the aggregate effect of the policy by computing
the number of children born every year, before and after the policy is
implemented. In doing this, we leave aside general effects. We use our
model to simulate many overlapping birth cohorts of women, between
the ages of 15 and 60. Each year, a new cohort enters and the oldest co-
hort exits. Hence, when the policy is implemented, women are at differ-
ent stages of their life cycle. The older ones have already made their fer-
tility choices, while the youngest ones are still far from their first child.
However, the latter can alter their occupation, their labor supply, or their
savings in response to the policy. Figure 4b plots the increase in the num-
ber of children born every year, compared to a baseline without a cash
transfer. The policy starts in year 4 and is not anticipated. We observe a
spike in the number of children born, with a 4.5 percent increase in total
fertility in the first year of the policy. This spike is what a reduced-form
analysis would identify as the short-run effect of the policy. However, the
effect of the policy lasts more than a few years. The effect reduces to half
that size after 8 years and is very close to zero after 20 years. Simulating pol-
icies with various levels of benefit, we find a short-run elasticity with re-
spect to benefits of about 0.04.44
While figure 4b displays the composite response to the policy for women
in different age groups, we illustrate in table 8 the effect of the policy on44 This elasticity is similar to the one reported by Zhang, Quan, and van Meerbergen
(1994) (0.05) and lower than that reported by Milligan (2005) (0.10).
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career costs of children 325women in three different age groups at the start of the policy (15, 25, and
35). For the group of women who are 15 when the policy is implemented
and who can adjust not only fertility but also their labor supply, consump-
tion, andoccupation choices, theproportion of thosewith no childrende-
creases by 0.8 percent, while the proportion with two children (or more)
increases by 0.2 percent. The policy induces women to have their first
child earlier (by 0.4 year) and leadsmothers to spend about 0.1 year longer
out of work, which translates into lower levels of skills (by about 0.3 per-
cent). Similar effects of cash transfers have been found by Card, Chetty,
and Weber (2007) in the context of a lump-sum severance payment. We
also find a moderate increase in part-time work for the youngest cohort.FIG. 4.—Effect of child premium. Panel a shows the effect of the policy (cash transfer of
€6,000 at birth) by age on the probability of giving birth, comparing the policy to the baseline.
In the policy scenario, women learn at age 15 about the policy. Panel b depicts the aggregate
effect of thepolicy, by year, in anoverlapping generationeconomy.The graphaggregates each
year the behavior of women aged 15–60. Each year a new cohort of 15-year-olds enters the
economy and the cohort who is 60 exits. The policy starts in year 4. Panel c displays the per-
centage change in assets as a function of age, compared to a baseline without transfer. The
birth cohort who is 15 at the start of the policy can adjust right away their behavior. The co-
horts who are 20 or 25 when the policy starts do not anticipate the policy.This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
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AllFinally, the proportion of women opting for a routine or manual job in-
creases, respectively, by 0.3 and 0.07 percent. Cash transfers therefore al-
lowwomen to opt for less lucrative careers whilemaintaining a similar level
of consumption. For older cohorts, the responses are muted asmany deci-
sions have already been made, and women have less scope to respond to
the policy. For instance, as occupational choices are made predominantly
at a young age before training in vocational schools, there is no discernible
effect on occupational choices.
An important channel through which cash transfers affect behavior is
assets. One reason for fertility to be brought forward is that fewer assets
need to be accumulated before a child is born. To investigate this fur-
ther, we plot in figure 4c the change in assets due to the policy for women
who have been 15, 20, and 25 when the policy was implemented, in per-
cent deviation from the no-policy scenario. The youngest cohort antici-
pates the policy and saves less in their early 20s. When children are born,
around age 27 on average, the conditional cash transfer is saved and
spread over a period lasting about 10 years. Assets then decrease below
the baseline by about 2 percent as the household has lower resources be-
cause of lower skill levels and more children. The patterns for the older
cohorts are similar, but these have less scope to adjust their savings.
These results not only highlight the important difference in the short-
and longer-run effect of these policies on choices other than fertility but
also stress that the impact of these policies may be largest for cohorts
that do not show immediate fertility responses, because of their younger
age. For these cohorts, such policies may have important consequencesTABLE 8
Effect of Increased Child Beneﬁts
Age at Start of Policy
15 25 35 45
Change, no child (%) 2.8% 2.7% 0% 0%
Change, one child (%) 2.08% 2.05% 2.05% 0%
Change, two children (%) .2% .2% .07% 0%
Change, age at first birth (years) 2.4 2.1 2.0005 0
Change, age at second birth (years) 2.04 2.007 .002 0
Change, skills (%) 2.29% 2.11% 2.049% 2.0019%
Change, number of years working 2.08 2.03 2.01 2.0004
Change, number of years working part-time .04 .01 2.007 2.0003
Change, proportion routine .3% 0% 0% 0%
Change, proportion manual .07% 0% 0% 0%This content downloaded from 128.040.
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a090.253 on
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12,000 individuals.:13 AM
.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
career costs of children 327for career decisions as well as savings decisions—aspects that are usually
not investigated in the literature.V. ConclusionIn this paper, we develop and estimate a model of fertility and career
choice that sheds light on the complex decisions determining fertility
choices, how these interact with career decisions, and how they determine
the career costs of children. Following early work by Polachek (1981), we
consider occupational choice as an essential part of a woman’s career plan.
We show that different occupations not only imply different opportunity
costs for intermittency and different wage growth but diverge in the ame-
nity “child raising value.” Moreover, the loss of skills when interrupting
work careers varies across occupations, is nonlinear over the career cycle,
and is highest at around midcareer, which has potentially important im-
plications for the interplay between career choice and fertility.
Thus, the costs of fertility consist of a combinationof occupational choice,
lost earnings due to intermittency, lost investment into skills, and atrophy
of skills while out of work and a reduction in work hours when in work.
In addition, fertility plans affect career decisions already before the first
child is born, through the choice of the occupation for which training
is acquired—an aspect that is important not only for policies aimed at in-
fluencing fertility behavior but also for understanding behavior of women
before children are born. An important additional aspect for the lifetime
choices of fertility and career is savings that help women to smooth con-
sumption. Furthermore, fertility leads to sorting of women into work, with
the composition of the female workforce changing over the life course of
a cohort of women, because of different career and fertility choices made
by women of different ability.
These complex interdependencies between fertility and career choices
imply that pro-natalist policies have effects over and above their primary
intention, something that we illustrate in the simulations of our model.
Moreover, the impact of any such policy is likely to be particularly pro-
nounced for cohorts of women that are at the beginning of their careers,
as they are able to adjust all future decisions in response, such as occupa-
tional choices and the timing of the first birth. These women, however,
are usually not the subject of analysis in empirical work that evaluates
these policies, the reason being that because of their young age, their
fertility behavior does not respond around the policy implementation.
Furthermore, it is not just fertility that may be affected, but other career
decisions associated with fertility as well. Our analysis suggests that re-
sponses of this sort may be important, leading to possibly undesired con-
sequences of any such policies. As DiD designs require restrictive assump-This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
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Alltions to interpret longer-term effects to policy interventions as causal,
they typically focus on short-term effects around the policy intervention.
Combinations of clean designs with structural models of the sort pre-
sented in this paper may therefore be an avenue that helps exploring
the longer-term effects of policy interventions.Appendix
Model Description
A. Probability of Marriage and Divorce
The probability of marriage is a function of age, skills, and taste for children:
P hit 5 1jhit21 5 0; ageMit , xit , f Cið Þ 5 lM0 1 lM1 ageMitð Þ 1 lM2 xit 1 lM3 f Ci , (A1)
where lM1 ðÞ is a nonlinear function of the age of the woman. We define the prob-
ability of divorce as a function of age and the number of children in the house-
hold:
P hit 5 0jhit21 5 1; ageMit , nitð Þ 5 lD0 1 lD1 ageMitð Þ 1 lD2nit , (A2)
where again lD1 ðÞ is a nonlinear function of the age of the woman.
B. Job Offer Probability
Offers consist of an occupation ~o and of hours of work ~l (either part-time or full-
time work). New offers arrive randomly and depend on the current occupation
and hours of work. The probability of receiving a job offer is denoted f0(oit, lit).
Conditional on having received an offer, the probability of that offer being in oc-
cupation ~o with hours of work ~l is f1ð~o,~l joit , litÞ and depends again on current oc-
cupation and hours of work. We impose some structure on that probability as it
contains potentially many terms to be estimated. We assume that the offer con-
cerning hours of work depends only on prior hours of work, whereas occupation
offers depend on prior occupation and prior working status (i.e., working or out
of the labor force, but not whether the individual is in part-time or full-time
work). Variations in the rate of part-time work across occupations in the model
come from differential fertility choices across women and the amenity value of
occupations with regard to children.
C. Utility Function
Women derive utility from their own consumption, the number of children, and
leisure. We define Ij an indicator variable taking the value of one if j is true and
zero otherwise. The utility function takes the following form for individual i in
period t :This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
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(A3)
The first term is the utility obtained from consumption (cit). The parameter gC
is the relative risk aversion and c is a consumption scale. As in Attanasio et al.
(2008) and Blundell et al. (2013), we allow for an interaction between consump-
tion and labor supply. We distinguish between part-time work, unemployment,
and being out of the labor force. We introduce heterogeneity in the utility of lei-
sure through the variable f Li . We also allow the marginal utility of consumption
to differ when children are present (through the parameter gNC). The individual
also derives utility from the number of children, which is displayed in the third
line. Theparametersg1N ð f Ci Þ and g2N ð f Ci Þ vary with the taste for children, f Ci . Finally,
we allow the utility from children to differ when a husband is present (hit 5 1).
The fourth to eighth lines allow for the utility of children to vary with labor sup-
ply and occupation choices. In a demanding occupation, the individual derives
a lower utility from children, as it is more difficult to spend time with them. For
instance, even if part-time work is available, the woman may not be able to stay at
home when the child is sick or reschedule hours of work to attend a school per-
formance. We also distinguish between different statuses of nonwork, as women
who are unemployed may require time to search for a job. It should be noted
that, because full-time work is the baseline, we do not specify a utility level asso-
ciated with that outcome. In lines 6 and 7, we allow mothers who work part-time
to obtain utility from leisure (relative to full-time work) dependent on the age
of their youngest child. Here, we distinguish between infancy (0–3 years), pre-
school (4–6 years), and primary school (7–9 years). The final part of the utility
function introduces iid preferences toward conception or nonconception, de-
noted hCit and h
NC
it . The shock that affects the woman depends on whether she de-This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
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Allcides to conceive or not (indicated by the indicator variable bit). These shocks are
assumed iid and extreme value distributed.
D. Dynamic Choice
We now describe in more detail the dynamic choices individuals make. Table A1
in the online appendix lists the notation used in the model. The main text de-
scribes it with the generic Bellman equation:
Vt Qitð Þ 5 max
bit ,cit ,oit ,litf g
u cit , oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it , ϒit , fið Þ 1 bEtVt11 Qit11ð Þ, (A4)
with the state space defined as
Qit 5 lit21, oit21, Ait21, hit21, age
M
it , xit , nit , age
K
it , ϒit , fif g: (A5)
The Bellman equation can be decomposed into a sequence of choices, involv-
ing conditional value functions, where the conditioning is on labor supply status
and the decision to conceive or not. We make the distinction between being in
work, being unemployed, and being out of work because individuals face different
choice sets. For instance, individuals out of the labor force are not eligible for un-
employment benefits and cannot choose to become unemployed in the next pe-
riod. Individuals who choose to conceive have a probability of becoming pregnant
and cannot be fired. Hence, these conditional value functionsmodel institutional
features explicitly, which are implicit only in (A4).
The individual maximizes these conditional value functions in sequence, which
simplifies the overall model as one can rely on closed-form solutions for some of
the choices, given particular distributional assumptions on the taste shocks in ϒit
(extreme value distribution). We denote these conditional value functions by
indexing them with C for conception or NC if the individual decides not to con-
ceive. We also index them withW for work (either part-time or full-time; the
distinction hours of work is contained in the state variable lit in Qit), U for unem-
ployment, and O for out of the labor force. Finally, we introduce two value func-
tions describing individuals after birth, who enter that state from work or nonem-
ployment, and index these, respectively, by LW and LNW. At the beginning of a
period, women take as given their age, skills, occupation, labor supply in the pre-
vious period, the number of children, the age of the youngest child, whether
the spouse is present, and family assets. Women first observe the income shock
to their wage and to the earnings of the husband, if present, and then decide
whether to conceive a child or not. If conception is successful, the child is born
at the beginning of the next period. Women next decide how much to consume
and save.
Once fertility and consumption choices have been made, individuals observe
shocks to labor supply, which consist of layoffs (if in work) and job offers. These
shocks determine the labor status at the beginning of the next period. New of-
fers arrive randomly and have two features: occupation and part-time or full-time
work. The probability of receiving a job offer is denoted f0(oit, lit) and depends
on the current occupation and hours of work. Conditional on having received anThis content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
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period t1 1 is f1ð~o,~l joit , litÞ and depends again on current occupation and hours
of work.
Value of working.—We start with the value of working and conceiving a child. In
writing the values, we distinguish their deterministic part from the stochastic
part due to the preference shocks, which we introduce below and which enter
in a linear and additive way. As the decision to conceive has already been made,
the woman has to decide how much to consume. Choices over occupations and
hours of work are made at the end of the period. The value is written as
V W ,C Qitð Þ 5 max
cit
u cit , oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it , ϒit , fið Þ
1 p ageMit , f
F
ið Þ bEtV LW QPit11ð Þ
1 d 1 2 p ageMit , f
F
ið Þ½  bEtV U Qit11ð Þ
1 1 2 dð Þ 1 2 p ageMit , f Fið Þ½  ½1 2 f0 oit , litð ÞbE max
1 1 2 dð Þ 1 2 p ageMit , f Fið Þ½  bf0 oit , litð ÞEgmax,
(A6)
where Et is the expectation operator. The first line consists of the current utility
of consumption, leisure, and children. The second line is the future flow of util-
ity if conception is successful, which occurs with a probability pðageMit Þ. As the
woman is working in the current period, she is entitled to paid maternity leave,
with a flow of utility V LW ðÞ, defined below. This value depends on the next state
space QPit11, where the superscript P indicates that the women is pregnant, so that
the number of children is increased by one and the age of the youngest child is
set to zero. Assets and skills evolve as described in equations (1) and (2).
The last three lines describe the case in which conception is unsuccessful. With
a probability d the individual is laid off and starts next period in unemployment,
with a value V U(). If she is not laid off, she does not get an alternative job offer
with a probability 1 2 f0ðoit , litÞ and has to choose between staying in work, leaving
for unemployment, and leaving the labor force. We define the term Emax as
Emax 5 Et max V
W Qit11ð Þ 1 hWit11, V U Qit11ð Þ 1 hUit11, V O Qit11ð Þ 1 hOit11½ : (A7)
The hkit11, k5W,U,O, are utility shocks, and we assume that they are iid and follow
an extreme value distribution, which leads to a closed-form solution for the Emax
operator. The final row of equation (A6) describes the case in which the individ-
ual receives an alternative job offer f~o,~lg. This happens with a probability
f1ð~o,~l joit , litÞ. In this case, the individual has to also decide whether to choose this
new job. We define the continuation value as
E gmax 5 Et o
~o≠oit ,~l≠lit
f1 ~o,~l joit , lit
 
max V W Qit11ð Þ 1 hWit11, V W ~Qit11
 
1 ~hWit11, V
U Qit11ð Þ 1 hUit11, V O Qit11ð Þ 1 hOit11,
(A8)
where ~Qit11 is the future state space when the individual accepts the alternative job
f~o,~lg and where ~hWit is the shock associated with the alternative offer. The value of
working without conceiving is defined as
(A8)This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
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AllV W ,NC Qitð Þ 5 max
cit
u cit , oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it , ϒit , fið Þ
1 bdEtV
U Qit11ð Þ
1 b 1 2 dð Þ½1 2 f0 oit , litð ÞE max
1 b 1 2 dð Þf0 oit , litð ÞEgmax:
(A9)
At the beginning of next period, the individual starts with an updated state space
Qit11, where all the state variables have been updated but the number of children.
Here again, the individual can be laid off and starts as unemployed or has to
choose next period’s labor market status.
Value of unemployment.—When unemployed, the individual can choose whether
to stay unemployed for another period or exit the labor market altogether. If
a job offer is received, the individual then decides whether to take up the offer
or to remain nonemployed. The value of being in unemployment and not con-
ceiving is
V U ,NC Qið Þ 5 max
cit
u cit , oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it , ϒit , fið Þ
1 b½1 2 f0 oit , litð ÞEt max V U Qit11ð Þ 1 hUit11, V O Qit11ð Þ 1 hOit11½ 
1 bf0 oit , litð ÞEt o
~o≠oit ,~l≠lit
f1 ~o,~l joit , lit
 






where we again denote with a tilde the variables involved with the alternative job;
for example, ~Qit11 is the state space for women who accepted an alternative job.
The value of conceiving while in unemployment is defined as
V U ,C Qitð Þ 5 max
cit
u cit , oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it , ϒit , fið Þ
1 p ageMit , f
F
ið ÞbEtV LNW QPit11ð Þ 1 ½1 2 f0 oit , litð Þ 1 2 p ageMit , f Fið Þ½ 
bEt max½V U Qit11ð Þ 1 hUit11, V O Qit11ð Þ 1 hOit11
1 b 1 2 p ageMit , f
F
ið Þ½ f0 oit , litð ÞEto
~o,~l
f1ð~o,~l joit , litÞ






If conception is successful, the mother is entitled to maternity leave but will not
be entitled to a job at the end of that spell, generating a flow of utility V LNW ðÞ as
defined below.
Value of being out of the labor force.—The value of being out of work and trying to
conceive a child is modeled asThis content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
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cit
u cit , oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it , ϒit , fið Þ
1 p ageMit , f
F
ið ÞbEtV LNW QPit11ð Þ
1 ½1 2 f0 oit , litð Þ 1 2 p ageMit , f Fið Þ½ bEtV O Qit11ð Þ
1 f0 oit , litð Þ 1 2 p ageMit , f Fið Þ½ bEt o
~o≠oit ,~l≠lit
f1 ~o,~l joit , lit
 






whereas the value of not conceiving is
V O,NC Qitð Þ 5 max
cit
u cit , oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it , ϒit , fið Þ
1 ½1 2 f0 oit , litð ÞbEtV O Qit11ð Þ
1 f0 oit , litð ÞbEt o
~o≠oit ,~l≠lit
f1 ~o,~l joit , lit
 






It should be noted that individuals who are out of the labor force cannot become
unemployed and start claiming benefits.
Value of maternity leave.—Maternity leave lasts for two periods during which the
mother is not working and receives maternity benefits. The amount she gets de-
pends on her prior labor market status. The value of maternity for a woman who
previously worked is defined as
V LW Qitð Þ 5 max
cit ,cit11
u cit , oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it , ϒit , fið Þ
1 bu cit11, oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it11, fið Þ
1 ½1 2 f0 oit , litð Þb2Et max½V W Qit11ð Þ
1 hWit11 1 V
U ðQit11Þ 1 hUit11, V O Qit11ð Þ 1 hOit11
1 f0 oit , litð Þb2Et o
~o≠oit ,~l≠lit
f1 ~o,~l joit , lit
 




U Qit11ð Þ 1 hUit11, V O Qit11ð Þ 1 hOit11:
(A14)
In this state, the woman is entitled to maternity leave, which consists of a fixed
transfer and a variable one, which is a function of prior earnings. If the individ-
ual did not work prior to giving birth, she is not guaranteed a job at the end of
the maternity leave and receives only the fixed transfer:This content downloaded from 128.040.090.253 on January 18, 2018 08:14:13 AM
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AllV LNW Qitð Þ 5 max
cit ,cit11
u cit , oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it , ϒit , fið Þ
1 bu cit11, oit , lit ; nit , hit , age
K
it11, fið Þ
1 ½1 2 f0 oit , litð Þb2Et max V U Qit11ð Þ 1 hUit11, V O Qit11ð Þ 1 hOit11½ 
1 f0 oit , litð Þb2Eto
~o,~l
f1 ~o,~l joit , lit
 




V U Qit11ð Þ 1 hUit11, V O Qit11ð Þ 1 hOit11:
(A15)
Conception decision.—The decision of whether to conceive or not is made as
V k Qitð Þ 5 max V k,C Qitð Þ, V k,NC Qitð Þ½ , k 5 W ,U ,Of g: (A16)
As the preference shocks toward conception and nonconception hCit and h
NC
it ,
which are part of the state vector Qit, are drawn from an extreme value distribu-
tion, the probability of conception takes a logistic form, with the values of con-
ception and nonconception as arguments. The decision to conceive, noted bit in
equation (5) in the main text, is the argmax of expression (A16).
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